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. ABSTRACT 
Historically, cyclic life limited gas turbine engine components have been retired when they reach an 
analytically determined life where the first fatigue crack per 1000 parts could be expected. By defini-
tion, 99.9t of these components are being retired prematurely as they have considerable useful life re-
maining. Retirement for Cause is a procedure which would allow safe utilization of the full life 
capacity of each individual component. Since gas turbine engine rotor components are prime candidates 
and are among the most costly of engine components, adoption of a RFC maintenance philosophy could result 
in subst~ntial engine systems life cycle cost savings. Two major technical disciplines must be developed 
and integrated to realize those cost savings: Fracture Mechanics and Nondestructive Evaluation. This 
paper discusses the methodology, and development activity required, to integrate these disciplines to 
provide a viable RFC system for use on military gas turbine engines, and illustrates potential benefits 
of its application. 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, methods used for predicting the 
life of gas turbine engine rotor components have 
resulted in conservative estimation of useful 
life. Most rotor components are limited by low 
cycle fatigue, generally expressed in terms of 
mission equivalency cycles. When some predeter-
mined cyclic life limit is reached, components are 
retired from service. 
Total fatigue life of a component consists of 
a crack initiation phase and a crack propagation 
phase. Engine rotor component initiation life 
limits are analytically determined using lower 
bound LCF characteristics. This is estab 1i shed by 
a statistical analysis of da~ indicating the 
cyclic life at which 1 in 1000 components, such as 
disks, will have a fatigue induced crack of ap-
proximately 0.03 inch length. By definition then, 
99.9t of the disks are being retired prematurely~ 
It has been documented that many of the 999 re-
maining retired disks have considerable useful 
residual life. Retirement for Cause (RFC) would 
allow each component to be used to the full extent 
of its safe total fatigue life, retirement occur-
ring when a quantifiable defect necessitates re-
moval of the component from service. The defect 
size at which the component is no longer con-
sidered safe is determined through nondestructive 
evaluation (NDE) and fracture mechanics analyses 
of the disk material and the disk fracture criti-
cal locations, the service cycle and the overhaul/ 
inspection period. Realization and implementation 
of a Retirement for Cause Maintenance Methodology 
will result in system cost savings of two types: 
direct cost savings resulting from utilization of 
parts which would be retired and consequently re-
quire replacement by new parts; and indirect cost 
savings resulting from reduction in use of stra-
tegic materials, reduction in energy requirements 
to process new parts, and mitigation of future 
inflationary pressure on cost of new parts. 
RETIREMENT FOR CAUSE METHODOLOGY 
Philosophy - The fatigue process for a typical 
rotor component such as a disk can be visualized 
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Total fatigue life con-
sists of a crack initiation phase followed by 
growth and linkup of microcracks. The resulting 
macrocrack(s) would then propagate subcritically 
until the combination of service load (stress) and 
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Fig. 1 Total fatigue 1 ife segmented into 
stages of crack development, sub-
critical growth, and final fracture. 
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crack size exceeded the material fracture tough-
ness. Catastrophic failure would result had not 
the component been retired from service. To pre-
clude such cataclysmic disk (and possibly engine) 
failures, disks are typically retired at the time 
where 1 in 1000 could be expected to have actually 
initiated a short (0.03 in.) fatigue crack. By 
definition 99.9% of the retired disks still have 
useful life remaining at the time they are removed 
from service. Under the Retirement-for-Cause 
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philosophy, each of these disks could be inspected 
and returned to service. The return-to-service 
(RTS) interval is determined by a fracture mechan-
ics calculation of remaining propagation life from 
a crack just small enough to have been missed dur-
ing inspection. This procedure could be repeated 
until the disk has incurred measurable damage, at 
which time it is retired for that reason (cause). 
Retirement for Cause fs a methodology under which 
an engine component would be retired from service 
when it had incurred quantifiable damage, rather 
than because an analytically determined minimum 
design life had been reached. Its purpose is not 
to extend the life of a rotor component, but to 
utilize safely the full life capacity inherent in 
that component. 
Residual Life - For simplicity this paper will 
consider component life limits which have been de-
termined from the crack initiation characteristics 
of the specific disk material, and will not ad-
dress the problem of intrinsic crack-life defects. 
While damage tolerant concepts are utilized in 
some instances to establish life limits, the ma-jority of components in current gas turbine en-
gines have life limits set by an initiation 
criterion. 
All fatigue data have inherent scatter. The 
data base used for design life analyses purposes 
must be applicable to all disks of a given materi-
al, and therefore includes test results from many 
heats and sources. Data are treated statistically 
as shown schematically in Fig. 2. The distribu-
tion of life, defined as the number of cycles nec-
essary to produce a crack approximately 0.03 in. 
long, is obtained for a given set of loading con-
ditions (stress/strain, time, temperature). As 
can be seen, the ±2cr bounds, which contain 95% of 
the data, m~ span two orders of magnitude in fa-
tigue initiation life. 
(3) 
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Fig. 2 Material data scatter results in con-
servative life prediction. 
When considered with other uncertainties in 
any design system (e.g., stress analysis error, 
field mission definition, fabrication deviations, 
temperture profile uncertainty) the final disk 
life prediction is made for disk crack initiation 
1 ife for an occurrence rate of 1 in 1000 disks. 
It is at this life that all LCF-limited disks are 
removed from service. This procedure has been 
very successful in preventing the occurrence of 
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catastrophic failure of disks in the field. How-
ever, in retiring 1000 disks because one m~ fail, 
the remaining life of the 999 unfailed disks is 
not utilized. The amount of usable life remaining 
can be significant, as shown in Fig. 3, where over 
SOt of the disks have at least 10 lifetimes 
remaining. 
1000.---------------------, 
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Calculated Lifetimes Remaining 
Fig. 3 The majority of disks have useful 
life after retirement. 
The means of extracting the remaining useful 
life from each disk must be safe to avoid cata-
strophic failure. This done by determining the 
disk crack propagation life (N) (at every criti-
cal location) from a defect ba~ely small enough to 
be missed during inspection. The Return-to-
Service (RTS) interval is then calculated by con-
ducting a Life Cycle Cost (LCC) analysis to deter-
mine the most economical safety factor (SF) to 
apply toN (RTS interval = N /SF). Cost vs SF is 
plotted fo~ each individual d~sk and combined to 
determine the most economical interval to return a 
module for inspection. An example is shown in 
Fig. 4. 
"' 1i) 
0 (.) 
i (.) 
~ 
:::; 
0 Safety Factor 
Fig. 4 Safety factor is determined from an eco-
nomic balance between high cost of fail-
ure vs cumulative costs of frequent 
inspections. 
The first required disk inspection is near 
the end of the analytically determined crack in-
itiation life. Only one disk in 1000 inspected 
should have a crack and be retired. The other 999 
will be returned to service for the calculated RTS 
interval: This inspection is repeated at the end 
of each RTS interval with the cracked disks being 
retired and all others returned to service. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates how the residual life is 
extracted from each disk after the crack initia-
tion life has been used. 
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components to economically utilize the RFC main-
tenance concept. 
These two requisite technologies are inte-
grated in the component life analysis. 
/ / / / Crack Found, 
,./ ,.,. ,.,. ,.,. Retire Disk 
The fracture mechanics approach to estimating 
component service life is based on the assumption 
that materials'may contain intrinsic flaws, and 
that fatigue failure may occur as a result of pro-
gressive growth of one or more of those flaws into 
a critically sized crack. Thus, the prediction 
and mont tori ng of crack growth as a function of 
time (or cycles) becomes one of the basic require-
ments of the analysis system. To utilize such an 
approach in practice requires quantitative infor-
mation on component stress, materials characteris-
tics, and nondestructive evaluation (NOEl capabi-
lities. Much of this information cannot be de-
fined as a single value, but must be described by 
a probability distribution. Two examples are: the 
probability that a flaw of a given size will exist 
in virgin material, or the probability of finding 
a given flaw size with a standard inspection pro-
cedure. In order to obtain a deterministic frac-
ture mechanics life prediction (given these dis-
tributions), the conventional approach has been to 
use worst case assumptions for all parameters. 
Employing all worst case assumptions for all pa-
rameters. Employing all worst case assumptions 
(deterministic) necessarily results in a conserva-
tive estimate for the service life of the 
component. 
NDE Limit ,. , , ,. 
--...-~~ 
Safe Return-to-Service Intervals 
Time 
Fig. 5 Base Retirement for Cause concept. 
TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT REQUIRED 
As Figs. 4 and 5 illustrate, Return-to-
Service intervals are based on two broad technol-
ogies: Nondestructive Evaluation (NOE) and applied 
Fracture Mechanics, and evaluated based upon eco-
nomic factors. 
Fracture Mechanics must provide an assessment 
of the behavior of a cracked part should it pass 
NOE with a defect just below an inspection limit. 
To assure safe return to service of a part which 
may contain a small crack, an accurate crack prop-
agation prediction is imperative. Recent strides 
in applied elevated temperature fracture mechan-
icsl-4 have provided the necessary mathematical 
description (models) of basic propagation, i.e., 
crack growth under conditions of varying loading 
frequency ( u), stress ratio (R), and temperature 
(T). Further works,G has expanded this capability 
to include loading spectra synergism, i.e., crack 
growth subjected to (frequent) periodic major load 
excursions separated by a small number (10-50) of 
varying subcycles. It is important to note that a 
typical mission loading spectrum to which gas tur-
bine engines are subjected bears little resemblance 
to that experienced by air frames, and therefore 
different predictive tools are required for each.l 
Referring again to Fig. 5, it is seen that 
accurate propagation predictions constitute a nec-
essary, but not sufficient, condition for the im-
plementation of Retirement for Cause. The other 
requisite technology is high reliability nonde-
structive evaluation (NDE). 
NDE must provide the means of screening disks 
with flaws that could cause component failure 
within an econemically feasible RTS interval. In-
sufficient NDE reliability has been a major argu-
ment against implementation of an RFC maintenance 
program. NDE capability with acceptable flaw de-
tection resolution has been available for some 
time, 8 •9 but -adequate reliability of flaw detec-
tion has been lacking,lO Complementary inspec-
tions and improvements in NDE single inspection 
reliability (by automation}, can provide there-
quired reliability for many gas turbine engine 
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To circumvent this difficulty, the problem 
can be treated probabilistically. A closed-form 
solution, which takes into account all the re-
quired probabilities, is far too complex to be 
practicable. An alternative solution is to employ 
computer simulation techniques. A probabilistic 
life analysisll.12 would use a distribution of 
flaw sizes. This type of analysis results in 
failure probability as a function of time, in-
cludes NDE reliability, and allows selection of an 
RTS interval to obtain an acceptable (low) failure 
probability with realistic NDE reliability. 
Both deterministic and probabilistic methods 
could provide some of the NDE reliability through 
multiple inspections and/or through higher NDE 
limits due to shorter RTS intervals. Since many 
NDE errors are the result of human frailty, multi-
ple inspection and automation can enhance detec-
tion reliability. The probabilistic system, how-
ever, has the ability to accommodate NDE relia-
bilty (probability of detection vs crack length} 
distributions and assess their effect upon RFC 
efficiency. Obviously, high reliability NDE is 
desired to optimize the economic benefits of 
Retirement for Cause. 
The RFC Procedure - The Retirement-for-Cause (RFC} 
flow chart (Fig. 6} illustrates a simplified view 
of how this maintenance concept can be utilized. 
When an engine is returned for maintenance, an 
economic analysis is performed on the engine 
component/module identified as a participant of 
the RFC maintenance program. lf the module has 
already been in service for several inspection 
intervals, the probability of finding cracked 
parts may be great enough to make reinspection 
economically undesirable and specific components 
of that module are returned without being in-
spected. This is determined by the economic an-
alysis at decision point one and is one of three 
possible decisions. An unscheduled engine removal 
(UER) may bring a module out of service that is 
more economical to return to service for the re-
mainder of its inspection interval than to inspect 
and recertify it for a new full interval (the sec-
ond possible decision at point one). The remain-
ing choice at point one is to tear down the module 
and inspect the parts. During inspection there 
again are three possibilities (decision point 
two). If no crack is found, the part is returned 
to service. If the disk is found to be unsafe, it 
is retired. The third choice is to investigate 
modification or repair of a flawed part. An eco-
nomically repairable part may be repaired and re-
turned to inspection (decision point three). 
'------"'""="'"--' -----1 ReUre 
Fig. 6 Retirement for Cause procedure 
flow chart. 
AN APPLICATION OF RETIREMENT FOR CAUSE 
The application of a Retirement for Cause 
maintenance approach to a military gas turbine 
system has been studied and technology development 
progams are currently underway. The demonstration 
engine system is the USAF F100 engine. Under 
uefense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) 
and Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories 
(AFWAL) sponsorship, a study entitled "Concept 
Definition: Retirement-for-Cause of F100 Rotor 
Components" Contract F33615-76-C-5172 (as modified 
in 1979) was performed. The results of this study 
are documented in AFWAL-TR-80- •••••• , the final 
report· for that program. 
The objective of the program was to determine 
the feasibility of applying a Retirement-for-Cause 
(RFC) maintenance approach to the USAF F100 en-
gine. The study was directed primarily toward ro-
tating components of that engine, specifically the 
various disks and airseals/spaces that comprise 
the prime rotor structure. The technical effort 
consisted of five tasks: 
• ::Jefine ari RFC methodology and a means of 
assessing the ROI for its application 
• Evaluate the disks of the F100 engine plus 
other appropriate engine rotor components 
for RFC applicability 
• Assess nondestructive evaluation (NDE) 
requirements for implementation 
• Establish a ranking of components for 
development priorities 
• Establish development plans leading to 
implementation. 
The methodology has been discussed in the 
preceding section of this paper. The component 
evaluations used a deterministic life analysis. 
Based upon this life analysis and life cycle cost 
analysis, 21 candidate components were selected, 
and development priorities established. Nonde-
structive evaluation requirements were determined 
for each of the components, and a development plan 
established, which when followed should enable im-
plementation of RFC for the F100 engine in the 
1985 time period. 
The development plan is shown schematically 
in Fig. 7, and addresses the technology develop-
ment requirements discussed previously. At the 
present time, many of these areas are the subject 
of Government contract procurement activities and 
cannot be discussed in detail. However, to illus-
trate some of the items which must be addressed, 
typical NDE requirements can be used as an 
example. 
I. Concept Definition 
-
II. Life Assessment Systems 
A. Methodology Development 
B. Component life Analysis 
= 
Ill. MethodotogyOemonstrahon 
A. Component Verification 
B. Engine Testing = 
IV NOE Development/Scale Up 
A. AFWAL Achvities 
B. DARPA Activities 
V. ImplementatiOn 
VI. DocumentatiOn and Coord~nation 
VII. Sustaining Engineering Activity 
rs1s 1 tsso 1 1981 1 1982 1 1983 1 1984 1 ,gas 
Fig. 7 Development plan engine component 
Retirement-for-Cause. 
A composite sketch of typical gas turbine en-
gine rotor components is shown in Fig. 8. As can 
be seen, the configuration of these components is 
complex and will require innovative techniques to 
enable reliable inspection. Examples of the types 
of defects which will require detection on these 
components are shown in Fig. 9. Techniques cur-
rently exist, such as eddy current, ultrasound 
and/or penetrants with the capability to detect 
these flaws. The major problem to be solved is 
detecting these flaws in a high volume maintenance 
environment, and integrating other techniques, 
such as proof testing, into a system with suffici-
ent rel i abi 1 i ty to enab 1 e Retirement-for-Cause to 
be economically viable. 
Benefits- The assessment of the benefits of a 
Retirement-for-Cause maintenance approach to a gas 
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Fig. 8 Composite sketch of typical gas tur-
bine engine rotor components (not all 
features are on all parts). 
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Fig. 9 Sketch of typical gas turbine engine 
rotor component flaw types. 
turbine engine is contingent upon many assump-
tions. These assumptions include: fleet size, 
anticipated usage rates, usage life, inspection 
interval, labor costs, parts cost and many others. 
To quantify the benefits of this maintenance 
concept for the USAF FlOO engine, 1 i fe cycle cost 
analyses were conducted. These analyses deter-
mined the change in life cycle costs of the F100 
engine that could accrue based upon implementation 
of an RFC maintenance procedure in January 1985 as 
opposed to a continuation of current or baseline 
maintenance practices. 
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The life cycle cost benefits amount to an 
approximate $250 million savings over a 15-year 
period. In comparison to the investment required, 
the development and implementation of RFC are 
extremely attractive. 
SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS 
Realization and implementation of a 
Retirement-for-Cause Maintenance Methodology will 
result in system cost savings of two types: direct 
cost savings resulting from utilization of parts 
which would be retired and consequently require 
replacement by new parts; and indirect cost sav-
ings resulting from reduction in use of strategic 
materials, reduction in energy requirements to 
process new parts, and mitigation of future in-
flationary pressure on cost of new parts. 
The methodology and procedures described 
herein are applicable to systems other than the 
F100 engine.· A cursory review of other gas tur-
bine engines indicates that the RFC maintenance 
concept is generic and has direct applicability to 
rotor components of those engines. In fact, the 
methodology has broad applicability to other types 
of engine components, and indeed, to systems other 
than aircraft gas turbine engines. The decision 
to apply RFC to other components or systems would 
be based upon economic factors, predicated upon 
the remaining anticipated service life of that 
system, and can be a viable maintenance concept 
for life limited components of all types. 
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SUMMARY DISCUSSION 
Bruce Thompson (Rockwell Science Center [now Ames Laboratory]): This community is particularly 
concerned with techniques that quantify in some detail certain of the flaw parameters. In your 
estimation of $200 million savings in life-cycle costs, what degree of quantification is 
assumed in the technique, and how much greater could that be if you had more quantification? 
Jack Harris (Pratt/Whitney Aircraft): All right, I will now show you my Achilles heel. In order to 
conduct these life-cycle cost analyses, we used a 100 percent reliable NDE assumption. We know 
that's not true. Before you say that 250 million is wrong, we also used an extremely 
conservative estimate of life. They tend to balance each other. The answer is yes, we can get 
quantitative; we have defined life from assumed flaw shapes. Quantification of real flaw 
shapes would give us, I would say, a quantum leap in our accuracy of the predicted lives. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman (DARPA): I was curious if Pratt and Whitney had ever looked at this concept in 
the sense of how it would impact the maintenance requirements, both scheduled and unscheduled 
and, therefore, the availability of the engine for performing its mission. 
Jack Harris: We are in the process right now of an in-depth look at that from the unscheduled engine 
removal standpoint. We looked at it from the scheduled engine removal standpoint in the 
previous study, but one of the ground rules that we are operating on is that we are not going 
to let the forced readiness deteriorate from the levels at which it is currently operating. It 
is not going to get worse. The question that you're asking me is: Is it going to get 
better? I hope so, but I'm not sure. But it will not get worse. That's a given. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: You are also fixed by the current maintenance intervals? 
Jack Harris: That's right. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: You didn't allow those to float, and I was wondering if in fact you had looked 
at that question. As the NDE gets better, clearly you can extend the interval safely. 
Jack Harris: You can extend the interval safely. Again, we want to cause the least possible change in 
the current force structural maintenance effort. So we have tailored our Retirement-for-Cause 
concept to meet those current inspection intervals. There are techniques, for example, proof 
testing techniques, that would enable you to extend the intervals on certain parts. That's 
great, but it doesn't do any good on a three-stage fan if we can extend the interval on one 
part to 5 times but we can't extend it on the other part in the fan module. We have still got 
to bring the module in at an interval set by the lowest residual life part in the module. Yes, 
we hope we will be able to extend the intervals as we get further into the program. That 
remains to be seen. They won't get shorter than the present intervals. By definition, they 
won't get worse. 
Joe Moyzis (AFWAL): When you say worse case, worse case, worse case, you assume a hundred percent 
reliability in NDE because what else can you do. Talking about realistic P.o.o., you mean a 
realistic P.O.D. in probabilistic fracture mechanics; is that right? 
Jack Harris: Yes. What we hope to be able to do is integrate the entire NDE, life, and economic 
analysis into one tool that will enable people to make decisions. That is our goal. 
John Rodgers (Acoustic Emission Technology Corporation): Taking an engine you essentially developed 
without Retirement-for-Cause in the conceptual design stages, and you now have an operational 
system, what do you think would be the economic benefit if you would take a design criteria and 
apply it to the F-100 today and redesign the engine to take full advantage of quantitative NDE 
and Retirement-for-Cause analysis? What do you think the resulting factoral economic benefit 
would be over what you projected in this conservative situation? 
Jack Harris: To be honest with you, we can do that today. It is called damage tolerant design, and it 
is a concept that a lot of people now apply. Unfortunately, it is one of those situations 
where you can't have your cake and eat it, too. The damage tolerant design concept would 
enable you to, in effect, design in Retirement-for-Cause from day one. You can do it. There 
have been some innovative techniques come out our Air Force aero-propulsi~lab-sponsored 
program that say the weight penalties are not going to be near what we thought they were going 
to be but there would still be weight penalties. Obviously, if the part's going to last - be 
able to sustain a known flaw for three overhaul increments, the part has to be bigger, it has 
to be heavier, the stresses have got to be lower so that our weight penalties - I wouldn't even 
try to make a guess at quantifying that benefit. I think we are premature there. I think 
within a few years we will have the damage-tolerant design techniques that will enable us to 
put a very attractive engine, from a weight-performance standpoint, in the field and still get 
the benefits of Retirement-for-Cause. 
We were amazed at the results of this study. We did not design the F-100 engine to operate on 
a Retirement-for-Cause basis. It was designed to provide the m~ximum possible performance at 
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the minimum possible weight. Consequently, we went to very high stresses. We have gotten the 
performance out of it. We have gotten minimum weight, but we have been astonished to find we 
can also use Retirement-for-Cause for a significant number of it's parts. Maybe that's 
serendipity. I don't known, but it sure looks good. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: Have you people worked on the viewgraphs to display to the Air Force some of 
the disk failures depending on how much maintenance and how many redundant inspections are 
performed as a function of money? Once you get to a real reliability case, you're going to 
have to accept a given probability of failure at a given cost, and, of course, we do today, but 
people don't like to admit it. They still believe it's a perfect system. Has ther been much 
thought on that yet? 
Jack Harris: Yes. I think it would be premature for me to really discuss it, Mike. For the benefit of 
all of you who are not aware, we will be entering very shortly into a four-year development 
program to obtain the necessary fracture and life methodologies. We feel we have the firm 
foundation for that. We have to pull them together and integrate them. That program will 
start momentarily, I hope, and possibly next year we might be able to discuss that. Yes, we 
have looked at that. We have made an assessment of how many failures per thousand or per unit 
might occur and so on. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: That, of course, will be impacted by the quality of the inspection. Procedure 
to a very large degree and this is where, in many ways, a reliable system is a quantitative 
system when you get right down to it. There can be other things which destroy that, but -
Jack Harris: Yes, possibly one thing that I may have glossed over. And I certainly didn't do it 
intentionally. We are looking, as I said, at very uniquely located and oriented flaws in very 
complex configurations. It would be great if they were just machined, but they're not. They 
come out of the field; they come into an overhaul system. They have oil on them, they have 
coke on them in some cases; they're dirty; they may have stains on them; and you're going to 
have to handle something like 1,000 to 1,200 of those parts a month. It's a pretty large 
undertaking. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: Last question, Otto, 
Otto Buck (Rockwell Science Center [now Ames Laboratory]): Given the detectability of five mils, given 
a fracture, certain fracture toughness, I guess that the design life is seven years now for the 
engine? 
Jack Harris: The Air Force likes to say the life of the system, just like Arden Bement said, is 15 
years. 
Otto Buck: What is your estimate at the present time for an inspectable period? How often would you 
have to inspect? Roughly. Do you have any estimates on those times at the present time? 
Jack Harris: Currently, you're dealing with cyclically life-limited parts. The time, in effect, 
becomes a factor of how many cycles a part accumulates. If you project under the current 
flight accumulation schedules for the F-15 and F-16, it indicates that you will accumulate a 
maximum of 12,600 cycles in a 15-year time frame. Beyond that, I would say I would have to do 
some back-of-the-envelope calculations. 
Otto Buck: Two years? 
Jack Harris: Figure it out. Divide 15 into 12 and figure how many cycles a year. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: The intervals are established by cycles and they are currently set. 
Jack Harris: And equivalent to some service usage. Maybe three years, for example. 
Unidentified Speaker: You said 39 tons of cobalt. How many engine disks is that? 
Jack Harris: How many engine disks is that? It is anticipated that before the last F-100 engine is 
retired and melted down, there will be somewhat in the neighborhood of 7- or 8,000 of these 
engines in the free world, maybe a few of them in the unfree world. But if you look at that, 
and you just figured how many of these disks, 14- 15,000 nickel-based disks, you're talking 
about a high percentage volume of cobalt. I can't remember the exact percent, but it's greater 
than 10 percent by weight in each one of these disks. You work back, and that's how they come 
up with 39 tons. 
The alloys we're looking at are titanium 6246 waspaloy, astroloy and IN-100. The latter three 
are all cobalt-bearing alloys. 
Otto Buck: As far as I know, the materials people right now are trying to make an effort to take the 
cobalt out of the super alloys, which will help, too. 
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Jack Harris: There are alloy development programs under way to either go with non-cobalt containing 
super alloys and develop the processing to get them to equivalent strengths, or to reduce the 
amount of cobalt used per a given component by new forging techniques. Net shape forging, for 
example, and a lot of those. 
Mike Buckley, Chairman: Thank you very much, Jack. 
20 
